By Xu Yizhen
The US and ROK recently reached their 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) after nearly half a year's negotiations. The new deal, which will officially come into force after being signed by both sides and ratified by the ROK National Assembly, will increase ROK's contribution to the US Forces Korea (USFK) to 1.5192 trillion won (US$ 1.13 billion) in 2026, an 8.3% increase from 2025, and will raise the share annually within the deal's duration from 2026 to 2023 based on the increase in Consumer Price Index.
The 11th SMA currently being implemented will expire at the end of 2025. Usually, the two countries would start negotiations for the next deal one year before the current one expires, but this time they started two years in advance – in April this year, and rushed to an agreement before November when the US presidential election will take place. It's worth noting that this new SMA reached in Biden's term will stay in force across the next four-year presidential term.
Analysts said the early conclusion of the deal is an attempt to avoid potential challenges if Trump returns to office next year. The splitting of the defense cost has been a point of divergence chronically troubling the US-ROK alliance. Trump pressured the ROK on this matter when he was in the Oval Office. He demanded that ROK bear more of USFK's expenses, repeatedly complaining that Seoul was "free-riding" America's security protection. During the negotiations for the 11th SMA in 2019, he demanded that ROK increase its annual contribution to US$ 5 billion, a roughly 400% increase, which threw the negotiations to a standstill and no deal had been reached until Biden swore in. If Trump wins the presidential election, he is sure to demand a higher contribution from ROK and put more fiscal pressure on the country.
For a long time, the ROK has been highly reliant on the US for security on the Korean Peninsula and therefore has little say regarding the USFK cost sharing. Although the 12th SMA is a major diplomatic accomplishment achieved with ROK's active efforts, its share has nevertheless increased considerably, again, and will continue to increase annually ever after. The US has agreed that the increase in ROK's contribution won't have to be in step with its greater increase in national defense spending, and could be linked with the Consumer Price Index, a specious response to ROK's appeal to share the cost within a reasonable scope, but Seoul still has to pay a great deal more money. This once again exposed the asymmetry of the US-ROK alliance.
Washington and Seoul have different axes to grind with their military alliance. While Seoul depends on the US for its defense security, Washington just wants to keep the alliance alive at the lowest cost possible to sustain its own hegemony. At the moment, the US is strengthening its alliance with ROK and pushing NATO's expansion to the Asia Pacific by, for instance, holding multiple highly combat-oriented exercises this year, including the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, in which the USFK bases act as the so-called "strategic anchor" for the US. As Washington proceeds with the major-country competition, the two countries are sure to hold more military exercises on security cooperation, and ROK would have to pay an increasingly higher price for America's military presence in the region.
Foreseeably, the US and ROK's divergences and arguments over their cost-sharing will continue. If ROK keeps passively strengthening its military connection with the US, it will find itself losing even the few bargaining chips it has left now.
